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Abstract
This article examines the concepts of self executing treaties and non-self executing treaties. These 
two concepts are inadvertently related to the dualist and monist theory of international law. They 
also relate to the question of direct applicability and municipal validity of treaties. This article will 
show that non-self executing treaties are not always analogous with the concept of dualism under 
international law. Likewise, treaties might presumably be self executing even in dualist states. It is 
therefore imperative to acquire an understanding of these two concepts by discerning and analysing 
them. Such understanding will provide clarity to the question of dualist transformation theory in 
regards to the municipal validity of treaties. This article aims to explore these two concepts, in 
particular their main ideas, how they relate and attempt to affect the theoretical problem of monism 
versus dualism with regard to treaties. This article traces the origins of the concept of self-executing 
treaties by examining it under  American law and the European Union legal order as well as relevant 
decisions by international courts. This article will then move to examine various scholars’ suggestion 
to establish criteria for non-self executing treaties.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The concept of non-self executing has been discussed intensively by 
scholars worldwide and it has been admitted that it is impossible to pro-
vide a satisfactory global and at once useful definition of what is meant 
by it.  Whether a treaty is or is not self-executing is arguably thought 
to be a domestic law question. It would thus vary from state to state, 
depending on different legal institutions and political considerations. 1 
Meanwhile, there is a growing call to restrict the domestic discretion in 
determining the non-self executing nature of the treaties. 
* The Author acquired its Doctoral degree on International Law from the Goethe 
University of Frankfurt and currently  the Secretary to Directorate General for Legal 
Affairs and Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia.  This Article is entirely 
his own personal and academic views. damos_agusman@yahoo.com
http://perjanjian-internasional.blogspot.com
1  Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National 
and International Law’, RdC (1992-IV), 368.
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The concept of non-self executing treaties is commonly associated 
and confused with the notion of dualist stance toward treaties. Under 
dualist theory, treaties bind on states, not in states. The treaty needs to 
be translated (transformed) into domestic legislation first. It cannot be 
directly applied domestically. Since dualism does not allow the self-
executing effect of a treaty in the domestic law, it is easily held that 
non-self executing is nothing but dualism.  On the other hand, self-
executing treaties are always seen as the product of monism since under 
this theory treaties bind “on” as well as “in” states in a manner that 
they can directly take effect in domestic law without requiring national 
legislations. 
The present article shall not explore in detail the problem and the 
controversial legal construction underlying the concept as practiced by 
states. It shall only explore its main idea, how it relates and attempts to 
affect the theoretical problem of monism versus dualism with regard to 
treaties. Despite the fact that the two notions do interface, it is neces-
sary to determine whether the question of self-executing and non-self-
executing shall be dealt with on the one hand, as an inherent part of 
monist-dualist rubric, or  on the other hand, shall be treated differently 
and independently. 
The two notions are inadvertently regarded along the same lines of 
argument, and to some extent involve the monist-dualist debate due to 
a common feature i.e. the critical role of domestic legislation to deter-
mine the validity of treaties under municipal law. The two concepts re-
spectively involve the requirement of legislation and may therefore lead 
to a similar indistinguishable effect. Therefore, for some scholars, the 
notion of non-self-executing and self-executing becomes a question of 
the domestic status of a treaty i.e. how and when a treaty may become 
valid under municipal law. It is a self-executing one when it requires no 
legislation and it is not when it requires legislations. In the case of the 
latter, the judiciary cannot directly enforce its provisions in the absence 
of implementing legislation. It is therefore commonly said that non-
self-executing treaties have no domestic law status at all.
Confusion then arises when the two problems are pursued from the 
same premise by which it may be induced that non-self-executing trea-
ties, as they require legislation, refer to the concept of ‘transformation’ 
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that is familiar to dualism. The ambiguous and confusing term ‘self-ex-
ecuting’ used in the American debate refers to both ‘municipal validity’ 
(related to the adoption-transformation process) and ‘direct implemen-
tation/enforceable’ for which the absence of legislation is a key point. 
Furthermore, it is also said that the distinction between self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties is one of domestic law only. In either 
case, the treaty remains binding as a matter of international law.
II. ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF SELF-EXECUTING TREA-
TIES
The notion of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties origi-
nated in and was developed by the American legal system more than 
a century ago2 when US Supreme Court Judge Marshall dealt with the 
case of Foster vs. Neilson.3 The case determined that the Treaty between 
the US and Spain on Amity, Settlement and Limits was non-self-execut-
ing. The reason was that the phrase - ‘shall be ratified and confirmed’ - 
contained therein was the ‘language of contract’ and that the legislature 
should execute the contract before it can become the rule for the Court. 
Thereafter, the case Sei Fujii vs. State4 ruled  that the California Alien 
Land Law was invalid as it discriminated against Japanese landowners 
and therefore was in conflict with the human rights provisions of the 
UN Charter. The case raised questions whether or not the provisions of 
the UN Charter invoked were self-executing. Since then, the doctrine 
has become highly controversial and draws scholarly attention, includ-
ing from outside the US.5 
2  Yuji Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the US, A Critical Analy-
sis’, 26 Va. J. Int’l. L. (1985-1986), 627.
3  Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
4  Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (1950).
5  Some European scholars consider that the notion of non-self-executing rules is to a 
certain extent doubtful and may give a false impression. These scholars include Ru-
dolf Bernhardt, Bruno Simma, Michael Bothe, see discussion in Tunkin and Wolfrum 
(eds), Walter Rudolf, ‘Incorporation of International Law into Municipal Law’, in 
Grigory Tunkin and Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law and Municipal Law (1988), 
40-46. American scholars also discourage the use of this notion, such as Henkin who 
sees the notion as a distortion of the US historic constitutional jurisprudence, see 
Louis Henkin, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?’ 91 Am. 
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The debate intensified when a proposed constitutional amendment, 
the so-called ‘Bricker Amendment’ (sponsored by then Senator John W. 
Bricker), was submitted and considered by the US Senate in the 1950s. 
These amendments would have imposed restrictions on the scope and 
ratification of treaties entered into by the US radically and would have 
declared that a treaty shall become effective as domestic law in the 
US only through the enactment of legislation. The proposed amend-
ment failed in gaining support and was halted in 1954. The proposal 
would have replaced the established principle of ‘treaties as the law of 
the land’, which has been traditionally understood by earlier scholars 
as ensuring their faithful observance without the aid or intervention of 
legislation on the part of the States.6
The controversial debate revived in the Medellin case7, where the 
US Supreme Court held that the judgment of the ICJ in the Avena case8 
was not self-executing. While acknowledging that the obligation of the 
US under Article 94 of the UN Charter to comply with the Avena judg-
ment is a matter of international law, the Supreme Court found that the 
language used in the Charter i.e. ‘undertake… to comply’ instead of 
‘shall’ and ‘must’ was only a commitment on the part of the UN Mem-
bers to take future action through political branches to comply with an 
ICJ decision. The case has generated further uncertainty with regard to 
the question of the domestic law status of non-self-executing treaties as 
the Court has not made a clear distinction between the lack of domestic 
law status and lack of judicial enforceability.9 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1997), 517. Myers S. McDougal finds that the notion is essen-
tially meaningless, and that the quicker it is dropped from our vocabulary the better 
it is for clarity and understanding, see Lawrence Preuss, ‘The Execution of Treaty 
Obligations Through Internal Law-System of The United States and of Some Other 
Countries’, 45 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1951), 102.
6  Samuel B. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (1916), 153.
7  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
8  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ Re-
ports (2004), 12 (Judgment of 31 March 2004); see also Request for Interpretation of 
the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ Reports (2009), 3 (Judgment of 19 January 
2009).
9  ASIL, ABA/ASIL Joint Task Force on Treaties in US Law, Report (16 March 2009), 
11-12.
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The manner of American courts applying non-self-executing rules 
which tends to leave their interpretation and application to the politi-
cal organs of the government - the President or Congress - and applies 
whatever decisions these organs may make, convinced some scholars 
to equate the concept with nothing but the doctrine of ‘political ques-
tions’.10 The political question doctrine deals with the question of 
whether or not the court system is an appropriate forum. As the courts 
have authority only to hear and decide legal questions, a case that is a 
political question will be declared non-justifiable and ultimately pro-
hibits the courts to hear and decide it. 
The concept of self-executing treaties, well known in the US, un-
derwent a transforming conception in Europe. 11 European scholars and 
practitioners term the notion as ‘direct applicability of treaties’ and were 
initially seeking references from the PCIJ in Danzig,12 where it is held 
that the Danzig-Polish agreement provided a right of action for Danzig 
officials. The Court declared that the parties to a treaty might provide 
rules creating individual rights and obligations, enforceable by the na-
tional courts. Since then, self-executing treaties were regarded in Europe 
as those creating individual rights enforceable by the courts. Direct ap-
plicability presupposes first of all that the treaty can take effect within do-
mestic law.13 It suffices to say that a treaty, as determined by international 
law, is directly applicable when it creates individual rights.
The notion ‘direct effect’ resembling ‘self-executing’ has been de-
veloped through European Community law with its own (supranation-
al) characteristics. The concept was introduced by the European Court 
since the 1960s when it held in the Van Gend en Loos case14 that Article 
12 of European Economic Community Treaty produces direct effects 
and creates individual rights which national courts must protect. Based 
10  Quincy Wrights, ‘National Courts and Human Rights: The Fuji Case’, 45 AJIL 
(1951), 64-65; Buergenthal (note 1), 382.
11  Yuji Iwasawa, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the US, A Critical Analy-
sis’, 26 Va. J. Int’l. L. (1985-1986), 629.
12  Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1928 PCIJ Series B, No. 
15.
13  Albert Bleckmann, ‘Self-Executing Treaty Provisions’, in Rudolf Bernhardt, Ency-
clopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4 (2000), 374.
14  Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 
(1963) ECR 1.
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on national and European jurisprudence, a directly applicable concept 
of treaties has developed in accordance with the special nature of the 
European Union legal order, which should be distinguished from in-
ternational law. It is presumed as a general rule, that all European laws 
have a direct effect as it lays down the principle that its subjects are the 
citizens who shall enjoy rights under the treaty. A treaty is directly ap-
plicable if a national court and national authorities can directly apply 
it; if it establishes subjective rights and duties for the individual; and if 
the individual can rely on it before national courts and national authori-
ties. The rationale of the direct effect nature of European law is based 
on dual vigilance15, where the Commission may bring an action against 
its member states and individuals may demand the application of Euro-
pean law from their domestic courts.
III. DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITy vS. MUNICIPAL VALIDITy 
The developments mentioned above inadvertently created, to an ex-
tent, diverging understandings about the legal nature of self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties, which relates to the distinguished ques-
tions of direct enforceability and municipal validity. Foster vs. Neil-
son concerns the domestic judicial enforcement of treaties16 while the 
‘Bricker Amendment’ is about municipal validity, which was suggested 
to apply the transformation mode. The Medellin case seems to grasp 
the two concepts and leave them undistinguished. Thereafter, the ques-
tion of non-self-executing treaties has been discussed as covering both 
direct enforceability and municipal validity of treaties. 
It is then argued that if the issue of non-self-executing treaties does 
not confine to a restrictive circumstance or if it is considered from the 
15  Stephen Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (2007), 96.
16  Henkin underlined that Chief Justice John Marshall in the case did not contemplate 
that some treaties might not be the law of the land. Marshall only found that some 
promises by their character could not be ‘self-executing’, see Louis Henkin, ‘U.S. 
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker’, 89 AJIL 
(1995) 2, 346-347. Henry said that the Chief Justice merely spoke of one case in 
which a treaty would not be self-executing, that is, when one of the sovereign nations 
promises to do an act, see Leslie Henry, ‘When is A Treaty Self-Executing’, 27 Mich. 
L. Rev. (1929) 7, 777-778.
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perspective of validity instead of applicability of a treaty, the question 
turns into a transformation-dualist and adoption-monist controversy. In 
this regard, what occurs in the American debate concerning this issue 
is, as Henkin17 claims, a moving jurisprudence directly from monism to 
dualism, whereby it abandons a principal element of the constitutional 
doctrine that treaties are law of the land, by declaring them to be non-
self-executing. 
The United States’s adherence to human rights conventions has at-
tached to each of its ratifications a ‘package’ of reservations, under-
standings and declarations (RUDs), which are amongst others guided 
by principle that every international human rights agreement should be 
‘non-self-executing’.18 In ratifying the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights of 1966, for example, the United States declared:
The provisions of Articles 1 through 27 are not self-executing. This 
declaration did not limit the international obligations of the United 
States under the Covenant. Rather, it means that, as a matter “of 
domestic law, the Covenant does not, by itself, create private rights 
directly enforceable in U.S. courts.”19 
It appears that such a declaration constitutes an application of the 
transformation-dualist approach instead of determining a non-self ex-
ecuting treaty and is, as Henkin’s allegation above, against the monist 
construction of Article VI of the United States constitution. The dec-
laration has regarded all substantive norms non-self-executing indis-
criminately without due regard for the merits of the given norms.20 
Wildhaber21 also identifies confusion amongst scholars as too many 
17  Louis Henkin, ‘Implementation and Compliance: Is Dualism Metastasizing?’ 91 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1997), 517, 517.
18  Henkin, ibid, 341.
19  Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of The Cov-
enant, Initial reports of States parties due in 1993, Addendum, CCPR/C/81/Add.4, 
para. 8.
20  Buergenthal claims the United States is applying an indiscriminate fashion in de-
termining treaties as non-self-executing in order to embrace different grounds for 
refusing to enforce a treaty as domestic law and is the only monist state where the 
determination may depend on considerations other than the language of the treaties, 
see Buergenthal (note 1), 368-383. 
21  Luzius Wildhaber, Treaty-Making Power and Constitution: An International and 
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use the term non-self-executing treaties without adequately defining it. 
The concept is used to describe two different situations. First, treaties 
are self-executing if the entry into force of the treaties under internation-
al law suffices to render treaties municipally binding and obligatory. In 
this regard, one might be tempted to assume that for states subscribing 
monist adoption treaties are self-executing, while for those subscrib-
ing dualist-transformation treaties always non-self-executing.22 Second, 
a treaty is self-executing if municipal courts can apply it immediate-
ly without further implementing acts to individuals. As the American 
common law has hardly departed from the monist-dualist theoretical 
debate and preferred the actual behaviour of municipal courts, the term 
of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties will refer to both situa-
tions. Through the approach one tends to seek directly which norms are 
judicially enforceable or not in the municipal courts, thus covering both 
questions in the same vein concerning direct enforceability and mu-
nicipal validity. Practically, it seems difficult to assert that valid norms 
cannot be enforceable as the courts only enforce norms that have been 
part of municipal law. 
The problem becomes exacerbated because the American Constitu-
tion theoretically subscribes to the adoption-monist approach for trea-
ties, by which: all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby23. Unlike Ameri-
can law, British law finds the issue of self-executing and non-self-exe-
cuting treaties less controversial because the transformation doctrine is 
perfectly applied. Under this doctrine, legislations are in place for the 
Comparative Study (1971), 226-227.
22  It is always argued that treaties have not been incorporated in the municipal law of 
the United States because they are not self-executing, see Manley O. Hudson, ‘Char-
ter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law’, 44 AJIL (1950) 3, 545. It is also 
thought that there are treaties which are not immediately part of the law of the land 
but require the aid of a statute, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Power of Congress and 
the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions’, 25 
Cal. L. Rev. (1936-1937) 643,  649-650. European scholars, which commonly use the 
term ‘direct effect’ and ‘indirect effect’, identify indirect effect as applied in the many 
states that require transformation into domestic law, see André Nollkaemper, National 
Courts and the International Rule of Law (2011), 118.
23  Article VI, para. 2 Constitution of the United States.
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courts to enforce the transformed treaties’ norms. In the transformation 
process parliament will cautiously ensure that the norms are phrased 
and set to be self-executing and enforceable in the courts. But since the 
inception of European Community law, the question corresponding to 
non-self-executing treaties i.e. whether the provisions are directly ap-
plicable becomes very important in British law.
To avoid confusion, many scholars are therefore strongly of the 
view that a clear distinction between the two is necessary in order to 
acquire a clear understanding about what self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties are meant to be. Some scholars24 criticize the tenden-
cy to confuse two issues and prefer to have them differentiated.  Firstly, 
formal validity (status) of treaties under municipal law (domestic incor-
poration issues), and secondly, the content of a treaty: whether it needs 
intervention legislation or relies on a domestic operator or is directly 
applicable. The first issue is whether and how treaties can be considered 
to be binding under municipal law that results from the application of 
the adoption-transformation doctrines. The second issue is about con-
tent and intent, or object and purpose that could only arise when under 
the first issue the treaty has been determined valid in municipal law.25 
In this regard the question on the non-self-executing and self-executing 
nature of treaties is relevant only when it has been preliminarily deter-
mined that the treaty has been adopted or transformed in municipal law. 
In line with this argument, Vazquez26 criticizes the tendency to read the 
Medellin case as holding that a treaty is non-self-executing unless its 
text clearly specifies that it has the force of domestic law.
24  J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different 
Concepts in Community Law, 9 CML Rev. (1972), 428; Iwasawa (note 140), 635-
649; Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal System 
(1993), 25; H. F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and Interactions between International and 
National Scenes of Law’, 112 RdC (1964-II), 79; Swan Sik Ko, ‘International Law in 
the Municipal Legal Order of Asian States: Virgin Land’, in Ronald St. J. MacDonald 
(ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1994), 739; Buergenthal (note 1), 318-319; 
Nollkaemper (note 22), 130-134; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘Treaties as Law of the 
Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties’, 122 Harv. L. 
Rev. (2008), 652-654.
25  V.T. Thamilmaran, ‘International Law and National Law: Element of Automatic 
Incorporation’, 11 Sri Lanka J. of Int’l L (1999), 237-238.
26  Manuel Vázquez (note 24), 652.
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The question of direct effect has also been addressed vaguely by the 
judgment of the ICJ in the case of Avena of 2009 on the Request for In-
terpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 200427, especially on the direct 
effect status of obligations imposed upon the US as set out in paragraph 
153 (9)28 of the judgment of 2004. In addressing the question, the ICJ ap-
peared to be hesitant to make any clear legal position on the question of 
direct effect. In paragraph 44 of the 2009 judgment, it stated:
The Avena Judgment nowhere lays down or implies that the courts 
in the United States are required to give direct effect to paragraph 
153 (9). The obligation laid down in that paragraph is indeed an 
obligation of the result which clearly must be performed uncondi-
tionally; non-performance of it constitutes internationally wrongful 
conduct. However, the Judgment leaves it to the United States to 
choose the means of implementation, not excluding the introduction 
within a reasonable time of appropriate legislation, if deemed nec-
essary under domestic constitutional law. Nor moreover does the 
Avena Judgment prevent direct enforceability of the obligation in 
question, if such an effect is permitted by domestic law. 
Albeit encountering the question of direct effect, the Court seems to 
keep silent on various questions underlying the concept. It does neither 
clarify whether the judgment could decide the direct effect status of an 
international obligation, nor does it pronounce a convincing view that 
domestic law could determine such direct effect quality. The paragraph 
suggests two conflicting clues. First, that the ICJ through its judgment 
may lay down that a state is required to give direct effect to an interna-
tional obligation, for which the Court did not do so in the Avena Case. 
Second, the means of implementation of a judgment may have direct 
27  Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), ICJ 
Reports (2004), 12 (Judgment of 31 March 2004); see also Request for Interpretation 
of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ Reports (2009), 3 (Judgment of 19 January 
2009).
28  Paragraph 153 (9) states: ‘(f)inds that the appropriate reparation in  this case con-
sists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own 
choosing,  review  and   reconsideration  of  the convictions  and  sentences  of  the 
Mexican nationals referred to in subparagraphs (41),  (51),  (6)  and (75)  above, by 
taking  account  both  of the violation  of the rights set forth in Article 36 of the  Con-
vention  and of paragraphs  138 to  141 of this Judgment’.
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effect status, as long as it is permitted by domestic law. It has been ar-
guably presumed that the statement demonstrates a tendency to merge 
the concept of non-self-executing/direct effect with that of the issue of 
transformation mode.29 
It would, however, be difficult to derive any clear guidance from 
the paragraph because the Court has at no time clearly defined what it 
means by the term ‘direct effect’ when linked to the related concept of 
modes of incorporation of obligation into domestic law.30 Discussions 
among US scholars clearly ascribed the term to the problem of non-self-
executing obligation that has long been debated. The interchangeable 
use of the terms has created confusion among scholars. The judgment 
added to this confusion because in the same paragraph another term 
is introduced i.e. ‘direct enforceability’ without clarifying whether the 
term refers to the same concept as ascribed by the term ‘direct effect’. 
On this point, a careful reading of the judgment on the Avena case 
quoted above will reveal that it is not really questioning the validity 
of the ICJ original judgment of 2004 within the US domestic law, but 
merely emphasises that the means of implementation of the ICJ i.e. 
paragraph 153 (9) shall be left entirely to the US. Unlike the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) Van Gend en Loos case, the ICJ appeared to es-
cape the question of direct effect of paragraph 153 (9) and clearly stated 
that it was not decided by the original judgment. For that reason the ICJ 
thus declined to give an interpretation. In paragraph 44 the ICJ stated 
that: In short, the question is not decided in the Court’s original Judg-
ment and thus cannot be submitted to it for interpretation under Article 
60 of the Statute.
The hesitancy of the ICJ to provide legal enlightenment on the 
question of direct effect was regretted by Judge Sepulveda Amor in 
his dissenting opinion through the argument that there existed different 
interpretations of the parties as to the domestic effects of an interna-
tional obligation for which the ICJ should have had jurisdiction. The 
Court could have made an important contribution to the development 
29  Nollkaemper (note 22), 119.
30  Winter prefers to reserve the term ‘direct applicability’ for the method of incorpora-
tion into the municipal law, and the terms ‘direct effect’ to describe when the provi-
sions is judicially enforceable, see A. Winter (note 24), 425-426.
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of international law by settling the issues raised by the conflicting inter-
pretation. 31 The judgment thus keeps the controversy surrounding the 
non-self-executing question undetermined. 
The direct enforceable and non-self-executing rules are common in 
every case of law application and may occur in municipal rules of dual-
ist and monist states. Most scholars submit that if the term ‘non-self-
executing treaties’ is meant to be not capable of being executed in the 
absence of additional implementing measures, it may also be equally 
applicable to other legislations or constitutions.32 Many provisions of 
national legal orders are not capable by themselves to be executed with-
out some additional legislation. A non-self-executing provision is not 
a question that exclusively relates to treaties but a common problem 
associated with the norms. Likewise, treaties might presumably be self-
executing in dualist states if an implementing legislation has been pro-
vided or adequate before ratification.33
Evan34 argued that in Foster vs. Neilson the courts held that legis-
lative implementation is necessary for the confirmation of land titles 
which were not perfected prior to the cession of territory to the United 
States and for the grant of patents to public lands of the United States. 
Whereas public lands might be sold by the President under the terms of 
a treaty, the money could not be disposed of without prior approval of 
Congress. So as a matter of content, the rule, albeit valid under munici-
pal law, could not by its own term become applicable under municipal 
law and therefore requires legislation to make it enforceable. In this 
perspective, the legislation was intended to make the rule enforceable 
before the court, not to transform it into domestic law.
31  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) 
(note 27) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sepulda Amor, para. 37-43.
32  A provision of the United States Constitution which empowers the Congress of the 
United States ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries’ is too general and requires a patent and a copy right legislations for 
them to be enforceable in a Court, see Buergenthal (note 1), 369.
33  Lawrence Preuss, ‘On Amending The Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study 
of The Problem of Self-Executing Treaties’, 51 Mich. L. Rev. (1952-1953), 1124.
34  Alona E. Evans, ‘Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties’, 45 Am. 
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. (1951) 66, 73.
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IV. CRITERIA FOR NON-SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES
The confusion arising from various views regarding the term has 
prompted a clearer definition for self-executing treaties particularly 
when explaining the nature of legislation involved. It strongly suggests 
that the nature of legislation as required for the purpose of making pro-
visions of treaties self-executing is an ‘implementing’ one instead of an 
‘adopting’ or a ‘transforming’ one. In an attempt to provide a clearer 
working definition Evans35 defines self-executing treaties as, generally 
speaking, those which can be executed by force of their own terms; 
those which require no implementation by Congress; and those which 
are addressed to the courts. Kelsen36 envisages clearly this very notion 
by stating that a norm of international law which is applicable by the or-
gans of the states without further implementation by national law may 
be called a self-executing norm. The legislation that might be required 
for a non-self-executing treaty is aimed at implementing the already 
valid rules rather than to give validity to the rules. Such implementing 
legislation, in this respect, shall be distinguished from transformation, 
which is aimed at giving validity effect to that norm. 
O’Connell37 put emphasis to the implementation of legislation as 
distinguishing self-executing from non-self-executing. He described 
the distinction as between two kinds of treaties: those intended to fall 
within the purview of municipal courts, and those which leave it to 
implementing municipal legislation to carry their purpose into effect. 
Panhuys38 also advocates the same line of argument by saying that the 
expression ‘non-self-executing’ means that the rule is phrased so that 
further enactments are required for its implementation.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 1948, has been commonly cited as describing a need of fur-
ther implementing legislation, as Article V prescribes that:
35  Evans (note 34), 74.
36  Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2003), 401-447; Edwin Bochard, 
‘The Relation between International Law and Municipal Law’, 27 VA. L. Rev. (1940) 
2, 194-196. He further states that only norms of international law providing for ad-
ministrative or judicial acts need transformation, this only if the administrative or 
judicial organs are bound by constitution to apply solely national law.
37  Daniel P. O’Connell, International Law, vol. 1 (1970), 56.
38  van Panhuys (note 24), 76-77.
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The parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective 
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provi-
sions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effec-
tive penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other 
acts enumerated in Article III. 
Article V would seem to suggest that the treaty is not self-executing 
in the sense that upon its ratification, prosecution could not be instituted 
in the municipal courts before the relevant criminal code would have to 
be amended.
Nonetheless, a survey of literatures suggests that the meaning of 
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties recently already tends to 
confine to municipal applicability instead of municipal validity of trea-
ties. Controversies surrounding the notions remain unsettled. Scholars 
have not yet agreed on determining the criteria for which treaties are 
and which are not self-executing, and to what extent international law 
or national law could play a decisive role for its determination.
In dealing with criteria, scholars have made extensive attempts to 
generalize treaties that require implementing legislation. Leary39 identi-
fied three relevant criteria used by American courts and scholars to de-
termine when a provision of a treaty required implementing legislation: 
(1) intention of the parties, (2) the precision and detail of language em-
ployed, and (3) whether the subject matter relates to powers belonging 
to the legislative or executive branches rather than the judicial branch. 
However, Leary acknowledges that the criteria hardly applied with suf-
ficient consistency to make an accurate prediction likely. Scharchter40 
finds it difficult to draw clear criteria and identifies that there are only 
two clear situations where a treaty provision requires legislative ac-
tion before it can become effective: (1) where the treaty has an explicit 
provision to this effect and (2) where the power to deal with the subject 
of the treaty is vested solely in the legislature, as for example a provi-
sion calling for criminal penalties or requiring a direct appropriation 
39  Virginia A. Leary, International Labour Conventions and National Law: The Ef-
fectiveness of The Automatic Incorporation of Treaties in National Legal Systems 
(1982), 57-63.
40  Oscar Schachter, ‘The Charter and The Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions 
in American Law’, 4 Vand. L. Rev. (1950-1951), 645-646.
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of money. Outside of these two categories, it does not seem possible 
to generalize regarding the kind of treaties which require legislative 
implementation: each case must be examined on its own merits in order 
to determine whether the treaty provision may become presently effec-
tive without awaiting further legislation. 
Vazquez41 draws four doctrines to explain why a treaty might be 
judicially unenforceable in the municipal courts:
1) The parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers unilaterally) made it 
judicially unenforceable. This is primarily a matter of intent. 
2) The obligation it imposes is of a type that, under our system 
of separated powers, cannot be enforced directly by the courts. 
This branch of the doctrine calls for a judgment concerning the 
allocation of treaty-enforcement power as between the courts and 
the legislature. 
3) The treaty makers lack the constitutional power to accomplish 
by treaty what they purported to accomplish. This branch of the 
doctrine calls for a judgment about the allocation of legislative 
power between the treaty makers and the lawmakers. 
4) It does not establish a private right of action and there is no other legal 
basis for the remedy being sought by the party relying on the treaty. 
Unlike the first three categories of non-self-executing treaties, a 
treaty that is non-self-executing in the fourth sense will be judicially un-
enforceable only in certain contexts. These four issues are sufficiently 
distinct and require sufficiently differing analyses, so that they should 
be thought of as four distinct doctrines.
Instead of drawing criteria, some prefer to enlist subject matters 
of treaties that are inevitably non-self-executing and for which imple-
menting legislation is required. Kelsen42 acknowledges that the norm of 
international law may require implementation by norms of national law 
such as declaring war, determining the competent organs, extradition, 
determining administrative and judicial organs, determining punish-
ment and penalty. He further indicates that all the norms of international 
law imposing obligations or conferring rights upon states commonly re-
41  Carlos Manuel Vázquez, ‘The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties’, 89 AJIL 
(1995) 4, 695-723.
42  Kelsen (note 36), 193-194.
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quire implementation by national law. However, if the national law al-
ready contains the norm that makes the application of international law 
possible, no further implementation is necessary. Likewise, it is also 
commonly considered as non-self-executing if treaties obligate a state 
to pay money to a foreign state or to foreign parties, create criminal law, 
or provisions are too vague or open-ended such as programmatic char-
acter. Wright43 has attempted a classification, and distinguishes three 
classes of non-self-executing treaties; (1) treaty provisions dealing with 
finances; (2) treaty provisions which require for their performance de-
tailed supplementary legislation or specific acts which the Constitution 
provides shall be performed by Congress (e.g., incorporation of terri-
tory, organization of offices and courts, and declaration of war); and 
(3) treaty provisions which are by nature self-executing, but because of 
historical tradition and constitutional interpretation require legislation 
to be executed (e.g., treaties defining crimes).
A survey of American court cases by Buergenthal44 has suggested 
that certain subjects matters will prompt treaties to be non-self-execut-
ing such as if its enforcement without specific implementing legislation 
would make the treaty unconstitutional, what are deemed to be exclusive 
legislative powers, and patent law. On the other hand, treaties of friend-
ship, commerce and navigation, granting most favoured-nation status, 
commercial matters, extradition, trademark, etc., are self-executing. 
Scholars are also divided when dealing with the question as to 
whether such determination is governed by international law or mu-
nicipal law. Winter45 asserts that the question of direct enforceability of 
treaty provisions is primarily, if not exclusively, a problem of interna-
tional law. Panhuys46 also argues that the determination of self-execut-
ing or non-self-executing natures shall be sought mainly by reference 
to international law and disagreed with the Dutch Supreme Court in 
its ruling that the answer must exclusively be sought in international 
43  Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations (1922), 354-355.
44  Buergenthal (note 1), 381-382.
45  J.A. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different 
Concepts in Community Law, 9 CML Rev. (1972), 428.
46  van Panhuys (note 24), 79.
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law.47 A contrasting view is advocated by Buergenthal,48  arguing that it 
is domestic law that determines whether the treaty creates rights which 
domestic courts are empowered to enforce in a state. The similar view 
is shared by van Dijk49 who holds that, as a rule, it is for the domes-
tic court to decide whether a treaty provision is self-executing or not. 
However van Dijk noted, as an exception, that it may well be that the 
treaty itself contains prescriptions to that effect thus such as the then 
Article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Article 288 provides that a regulation made by the Council or 
Commission ‘shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in 
all Member States’. 
Consequently, if the status of self-executing or non-self-executing 
treaties is determined by domestic law, it would be impossible to provide 
a useful definition to the terms because such determination will vary ac-
cording to the given state. A non-self-executing provision in one state 
might be self-executing in another state. The full reliance exclusively 
on municipal law in making such a determination in an unrestrictive 
manner and without objective criteria will lead to a situation where the 
merits of the treaty - the intention, the precision and detail of language 
employed - are not necessarily determinative. It may even induce states 
to decide all treaties are non-self-executing status indiscriminately in 
order to refuse the applicability of a treaty’s provision on the basis of 
non-juridical ones, such as national interest. If such a situation occurs 
it is no longer a matter of self-executing or non-self-executing treaties 
in the sense of direct enforceability but becomes a question of domestic 
validity, by which the transformation-dualist doctrine is actually com-
ing into play. 
In order to avoid political manoeuvring where a state does not wish 
to apply the treaties’ norms simply because they are undesirable, contrary 
to national interest, introducing progressive values, or are viewed suspi-
47  In 1962, the Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) ruled that the question whether a 
treaty provision is directly applicable or not is a question of treaty-law rather than a 
question of Netherlands law, see Judgment of May 18, 1962, Bosch GmbH N.V. v. de 
Geus en Uitdenbogerd, HR., 1965 N.J. No. 115.
48  Buergenthal (note 1), 317.
49  Pieter van Dijk and Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, ‘Parliamentary Participation in the Treaty-
Making Process of the Netherlands’, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (1991), 420.
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ciously by the internal judge purely by reason of their origin, Conforti50 
takes a cautious approach towards norms that owe their non-self-execut-
ing nature in order to impose more restrictions on the criteria for treaties 
to be non-self-executing. They are confined only to rules of two kinds. 
First, those that do not create any obligations for the state but merely al-
low for discretionary power, for example, states may draw straight base-
lines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Sec-
ond, those which, even as they create obligations, cannot be implemented 
because the necessary organs or mechanisms have not been developed. 
For example, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights of 1966 concerning the right to appeal a criminal conviction. 
It has been found inapplicable by Italian and Dutch courts where a higher 
court has not been created. He refuses to accept any other criteria as they 
may be arbitrary and carry political consideration.
A set of criteria has also been developed by the Van Gend en Loos 
case, as quoted above, to determine a direct applicable treaty. It has cur-
rently been formulated as containing three conditions: (1) the provision 
must be clear and precise, (2) it must be unconditional, (3) its operation 
must not be dependent on further action being taken by Community or 
national authorities. However, it has been argued that this set of crite-
ria appears to be applied more strictly when dealing with international 
agreements than when determining the direct applicability of Commu-
nity law. For the latter, there appears to be a presumption in favour of 
direct applicability.51
However, Van Gend en Loos case and the subsequent case Costa 
v. ENEL52 established a new principle where the Court found that the 
European Economic Community (EEC) - then European Community 
or EC - Treaty differed from ordinary international treaties and made 
quite clear that Community law creates rights directly enforceable by 
individuals in the national courts of the member states.53 Thereafter, the 
50  Benedetto Conforti, International Law and the Role of Domestic Legal System 
(1993), 27.
51  Pierre Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community 
Law’, 8 Europ. L. Rev. (1983), 177.
52  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., (1964) ECR 585, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585 
(Preliminary Ruling).
53  Buergenthal (note 1), 330.
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national courts of the European Union pursued a different approach 
when encountered with identical provisions i.e. between Article III of 
the GATT Agreement and Article 95 (1) of EEC Treaty. As revealed in 
the past, German courts refused to recognize the direct application of 
the GATT Agreement by arguing that while the GATT Agreement was 
an international treaty in the classical sense regulating economic rela-
tions amongst states, the EEC Treaty created its institution structure on 
which member states conferred, within a limited area, powers which 
the institution may exercise independently.54 The creation of some of 
its articles of direct rights and duties for the nationals of the member 
states was an effect distinct from the concept of self-executing provi-
sions in ordinary international treaty.55 The member states of the Com-
munity have accepted the theory of the Community Court that by join-
ing the European Union they transferred to it certain of their sovereign 
rights and legislative powers in order to remove obstacles to the direct 
applicability of Community law.56 The case may perfectly explain that 
the same wordings in the different instruments may be interpreted dif-
ferently under different legal orders, which is eventually beyond the 
content criteria.
The scholarly endeavours to establish objective criteria to draw a 
line between treaties that are and are not self-executing have not yet 
provided a satisfactory result. The difficulty is not only that it will de-
pend on the municipal law determination, which will vary from one 
state to another, but also on the fact that the decision should be pursued 
on a case-by-case basis before the courts. In the US the problem has 
become the subject of contentious debates between nationalist and tran-
snationalist approaches.57 The involvement of political and self-interest 
54  Gerhard Bebr, ‘Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: Development 
of Community Concept’, 19 Int’l & C.L.Q. (1970) 2, 258-259.
55  Stefan A. Riesenfeld, ‘The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GATT: A Nota-
ble German Judgment’, 65 AJIL (1971) 3, 549.
56  Buergenthal (note 1), 329.
57  The scholarly discussion on treaty enforcement in the United States has been high-
lighted by two mutually negated approaches between nationalists and transnationalists. 
Nationalists hold that treaties lack domestic legal force in the absence of implement-
ing legislation, courts should interpret treaties in accordance with executive branch 
policy preference, and that treaties do not create individually enforceable rights, and 
that the judiciary is not responsible for providing remedies for violation of a treaty. In 
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considerations to such a determination have added to the existing com-
plex problem pertaining to the concept, which would affect the good 
faith principle enshrined in the law of treaties. The different approaches 
pursued by US and German courts in cases58 involving the interpreta-
tion of Article 36, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 
have shown how the same provisions have been interpreted contrast-
ingly by the courts of the two states, and have therefore resulted in con-
trasting outcomes. Consequently, the enjoyment of an individual right 
conferred by the same treaty varies from one state to another.
V.  CONCLUSION
Following the arguments put forward above, it suffices to conclude 
that the survey of literature suggests that the discussion regarding the 
notion non-self-executing treaties has increasingly been confined to the 
problem of municipal enforceability and therefore is distinguished from 
the question on municipal validity of treaties. In dealing with the very 
notion, it must be presumed that the given treaties have already been 
afforded municipal status either through the application of adoption or 
transformation modes. The question at hand is whether or not a specific 
treaty provision is capable on its own terms to be applied in municipal 
law. It will be determined through relevant circumstances by means 
of international law and municipal law with the view of determining 
whether or not implementing legislation is still required. The determi-
contrast, transnationalists hold that treaties have the status of law in the United States, 
that courts should interpret treaties in accordance with international law, that treaties 
protect individual rights, and that the judiciary is responsible for providing remedies 
to individuals whose treaty rights are violated, see David Sloss, ‘When Do Treaties 
Create Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Ham-
dan and Sanchez-Llamas’, 45 Colum. J. Transnat’l. L. (2006) 1, 29-37.
58  Having contrasted Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and the German Bundesverfassungs-
gericht in the consolidated cases decided on 19 September 2006 (2 BvR 2115/01), it 
has been commonly concluded by scholars that the two Courts steered very different 
courses, see Carsten Hoppe, ‘Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and 
the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpre-
tation of Consular Rights’, 18 EJIL (2007) 2; Jana Gogolin, ‘Avena and Sanchez-
Llamas Come to Germany – The German Constitutional Court Upholds Rights under 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, 8 GLJ (2007) 3. 
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nation will involve international law focusing on the content or nature 
of the treaty obligation, stipulation, and the intent of the state parties; 
and municipal law dealing with the question whether and under what 
circumstances such enforcement requires devoted legislative action to 
accomplish this aim.
Applying the non-self-executing rule indiscriminately, arbitrarily 
and without fully taking into account the terms or nature of the given 
provisions will only dilute and complicate the already-existing dis-
tinction of methods of granting municipal validity of treaties (monist 
adoption and dualist transformation). It will entail a conviction that the 
question of non-self-execution is nothing but the question as envisaged 
by the dualist transformation theory and, therefore, will constitute an 
unnecessary repetition to the already long-lasting discussion about the 
same issue. 
The question of self-executing treaties becomes inevitable when 
treaties overlap with municipal law i.e. when both regulates the same 
subjects such as, in the case of American law, human rights. What was 
traditionally governed by municipal law is now also governed by inter-
national law. As treaty law nowadays enters into an area that was tradi-
tionally under the exclusive domain of municipal law, such as human 
rights norms, not all treaty norms could by their own terms be appli-
cable in municipal law without the aid of implementing legislation. Hu-
man rights treaties commonly create rights of individuals against their 
own state, which traditionally belong exclusively under municipal law. 
Such rights will inevitably involve an establishment of municipal legal 
framework and institutions, which would be out of reach of treaties. 
In this regard, implementing legislations are necessary to fill the area 
beyond the scope of the treaties and within this perspective, non-self-
executing provisions of a treaty should be meant as incomplete provi-
sions and therefore incapable for domestic implementation.
The question of municipal validity shall therefore be distinguished 
from the problem of non-self-executing treaties. The former is a matter 
of legal policy pursued by a state in dealing with the question of the 
relationship of treaties and municipal law, which shall be, as a matter 
of option, determined by its municipal law. The latter is not a matter of 
option but a problem of legal determination, which, albeit partly deter-
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mined by discretionary measure based on municipal law, should also 
rely on the terms of the treaty’s provisions. It is a juridical question 
and the answer should carry legal consideration which justifies that a 
treaty’s norm is non-self-executing. 
The non-self-executing nature is also invoked to prevent the intru-
sion of international law into municipal law in the upsurge of constitu-
tional resistance towards international law in the American legal sys-
tem. Such intrusions have already been considered to adversely affect 
the legislative power, which traditionally enjoyed privileges in creating 
rights and obligations of individuals. While it is the right of states to 
enforce policy to prevent the intrusion of norms of treaties into munici-
pal law, such policy should not abuse the very nature of the question of 
non-self-executing treaties, which is a purely juridical one. It is worth 
observing that by declaring a provision of a treaty non-self-executing, a 
state is not denying the rights and obligations thereof but merely delay-
ing their enforcement pending the issuance of implementing legal mea-
sures. In this regard, when a state under its municipal law determines a 
treaty is non-self-executing, it shall automatically follow that such state 
is under international obligation to take legal measures to implement 
the provision municipally as intended by the parties. Failure to do so 
will constitute a violation of its international obligations.
What is now required is merely developing a set of objective criteria 
to determine whether a treaty is non-self-executing in a restrictive man-
ner, on the basis of the presumption that once a treaty becomes the law 
of the land it will be self-executing unless the nature of its provisions 
dictates otherwise. Different results of the same provision of a treaty 
arising from the application of different non-self-executing rules by the 
parties to a treaty will constitute an unfair situation regarding perfor-
mances of state parties in carrying out their international obligations.
A survey of municipal practices suggests that implementing legisla-
tions are required when:
1) Treaties provide norms but according to the respective constitutional 
law such norms should be given effect only by municipal legislation, 
such as creating a criminal offence rule. 
2) Treaties establish permissive or discretionary rules and shall be 
determined by the respective states, such as to declare that they are 
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archipelagic states.
3) Treaties require states to make a prescribed municipal act such as 
determining base lines for the measuring of maritime zones.
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